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1. Introduction
Since the earliest generative approaches to binding, one of the most enduring controversies
has been the level(s) of representation where the binding theory should apply. While work
in the Government and Binding framework suggested that the binding theory might require
reference to D-structure, S-structure, and LF (e.g. Belletti and Rizzi 1988), this position is
made untenable by Chomsky’s (1993) Minimalist elimination of D-structure and S-structure.
Consequently, the binding theory is relegated to the C-I interface (LF), which sits somewhat
uncomfortably with the fact that binding exhibits properties typical of syntactic phenomena.
Hence, recent attempts have been made to bring the binding theory back from the C-I interface
(e.g. Epstein, Groat, Kawashima, and Kitahara 1998; Hornstein 2000, 2006; Reuland 2001,
2006; Kayne 2002; Zwart 2002, 2006; Hicks 2006), with the welcome result that the binding
conditions may then be reduced to narrow syntactic operations such as Merge, Move, and
Agree.
However, the Minimalist literature also provides apparently compelling evidence for the
binding theory applying at LF, as Condition A is shown to interact with other interpretive phe-
nomena assumed to hold at LF, namely quantifier (scope) interpretation, idiom interpretation,
and bound variable interpretation (Chomsky 1993; Lebeaux 1998; Fox and Nissenbaum 2004;
Sportiche 2006). This has been argued to show that these phenomena share a common input
with Condition A, i.e. a single LF representation. Treating each type of interaction individ-
ually, this article reveals that such a conclusion may be premature. In particular, it is not
Condition A that holds at LF, but rather an independent requirement that bound variables (in-
cluding anaphors) must be c-commanded by their binders. The narrow-syntactic and interface
approaches to Condition A make different empirical predictions with respect to the point in the
derivation at which local c-command must hold between the antecedent and anaphor.
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2. Evidence for a narrow-syntactic binding theory
2.1 Theoretical arguments
An approach which views the binding theory as a set of constraints applying at LF raises con-
cern under Minimalist assumptions. Crucially, Minimalism must seek to explain why—rather
than simply stipulate that—binding facts are the way they are. The Government and Binding
framework was able to pin down a reasonably successful account of the locality constraints on
binding through the definition of the ‘Governing Category’ (Chomsky 1981, 1986). In the spirit
of that approach, we can only realistically hope to find an explanation for why binding domains
look the way they do if they are in some way related to the constraints governing movement.
Indeed, the classical binding theory has envisaged a single explanation for the common prop-
erties of binding and movement (e.g. c-commanding antecedents of anaphors/traces, locality
constraints) since Chomsky 1973. Chomsky (1993); Chomsky and Lasnik (1993), however,
abandon one of the major insights of generative syntax, and with it, all serious hope of explain-
ing binding domains. Since movement must be considered a narrow-syntactic process, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it is natural to assume that binding is too: for example,
a narrow-syntactic approach to binding lets us make the strong claim that locality effects are
uniquely determined by syntactic factors, and not by properties of the interfaces. In light of the
fact that locality in both movement and binding is quite similarly constrained, an LF binding
theory would involve a conspicuous redundancy in that very similar locality constraints would
have to apply in narrow syntax (for movement) and at LF (for binding). This would surely be
a glaring weakness in any Minimalist theory; (the effects of) the local binding conditions must
therefore be determined in narrow syntax.
An ambitious but fruitful strategy in seeking an explanation for binding facts (rather
than simply aiming for empirical coverage) is to derive a theory of binding purely from prin-
ciples independently required in the framework. Recently, significant steps have been made
towards reducing the binding conditions to narrow-syntactic operations. The analyses of Horn-
stein 2000, 2006; Reuland 2001, 2006; Kayne 2002; Zwart 2002; Hicks 2006 outline different
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but related methods of explaining all of the central elements of the binding theory—including
c-command, local binding domains, and the encoding of referential dependencies—within nar-
row syntax. Moreover, each of these shows that the properties of binding follow from one or
more of the narrow-syntactic operations of Merge, Move, and Agree. The reader is invited to
review the above works for further theoretical arguments for a narrow-syntactic binding theory.
This article concentrates largely on empirical evidence, since this is the evidence on which the
argument for the binding theory at LF is most strongly defended. At any rate, we will see that
even the empirical evidence alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the binding theory does not
apply at LF.
2.2 Empirical evidence for a syntactic Condition B
As noted by Reuland (2001), a syntactic approach to the binding theory will generally be bet-
ter equipped to capture crosslinguistic variation in binding, since interface properties are, by
assumption, universal. We can support this kind of theoretical argument with empirical data,
showing either that processes assumed to apply at LF do not interact with Condition B effects in
the predicted manner, or that factors which cannot be relevant at LF are capable of influencing
the interpretation of pronouns.
2.2.1 Locality in Condition B domains does not hold at LF
Evidence from A-movement constructions could be used against Condition B applying at LF.
It has been argued by Chomsky (1995b: 327) that A-movement does not reconstruct (see, e.g.,
Lasnik 1999 for a summary of the arguments for this approach).1 Chomsky provides (1) as
evidence:
(1) *Johni expected [TP himi to seem to me [TP <himi> to be intelligent]]
1Lasnik (1999) proposes that A-movement and A′-movement are underlyingly different in that A-movement
does not leave a trace/copy. Boeckx (2001: 508, fn.2) highlights that Epstein and Seely (1999) reach a similar
conclusion and that Fox (1999) argues alternatively that A-movement leaves a simple trace, not a true copy.
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If reconstruction were allowed to apply to the raised pronoun in (1), effectively ‘undoing’ the
narrow-syntactic movement, a version of Condition B that applies at LF would be incorrectly
satisfied, since the unpronounced copy in the infinitival complement of seem would not then be
in a local configuration with the antecedent John.2 Yet Wurmbrand and Bobaljik (1999) show
that if the satisfaction of Condition B depends on the choice of a single position in a movement
chain at LF, reconstruction would in fact be forced in other A-movement constructions in order
to predict the attested Condition B effect.
(2) *Johni seems to me [TP <Johni> to be expected [TP <Johni> to like himi]]
Unless the copy of John in the deepest embedded vP (also containing the pronoun) is inter-
preted, Condition B is not violated at LF, since John and the pronoun are not, then, in a local
configuration. However, as Wurmbrand and Bobaljik concede, this argument depends on the
assumption of ‘LF-coherence’: the principle that any (e.g. moved) element occupies only one
position in the LF representation. It could be counter-argued that the theoretical problem for the
LF-approach to Condition B can be circumvented by assuming all parts of a movement chain
are present at LF. If so, even without reconstruction, (2) would violate Condition B. In essence,
such an approach to LF representations could allow an LF binding theory to correctly predict
that moved pronouns must be locally free from their antecedent at all points during narrow
syntax.
2Although Chomsky (1995b) does not specify what the binding domain for the pronoun is in (1), we may
assume that it is the infinitival TP complement of seem. The important point is that the binding domain does not
extend as far as the matrix clause subject. If it did, it would predict that the experiencer of the raising verb—in fact
closer to the pronoun than the overt copy of John—should be able to induce the same sort of Condition B effect,
contrary to fact:
(i) John seems to Maryj [TP <John> to be expected [TP <John> to like herj]]
Note that it is widely agreed that the experiencer (Mary) c-commands into the raising infinitival clause for the
purposes of binding and so would potentially be capable of inducing Condition B effects with a pronoun within
the infinitival clause, if it were sufficiently local.
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2.2.2 Phonological factors can affect Condition B domains
In light of the possible circumvention, we seek data which are less dependent on particular
theories of LF. If LF representations were indeed permitted to contain information concerning
each of the movement steps in the derivation, we could look to other kinds of information
widely assumed to be absent from LF representations to see if they can be critical in determining
Condition B effects. This would be in principle unexplainable if LF representations were taken
to be the input to Condition B. The first possible example of this is one observed by Fiengo
and Higginbotham (1981). A particularly well-known (but in many ways, problematic) piece
of binding data is that pronouns embedded in ‘picture noun phrases’ (henceforth ‘picture-DPs’)
which do not themselves contain an agentive or possessive subject can often be bound by the
closest subject:
(3) %Johni read [DP books about himi]
However, Fiengo and Higginbotham (1981) report that the judgment for (3) and similar sen-
tences is rather variable across speakers, a fact also conceded by Chomsky (1982: 99, fn.24).
They leave the grammaticality judgment open, which I indicate by % in (3). Fiengo and Hig-
ginbotham show that the stress assigned to the pronoun is critical for Condition B. Heavily
stressing the pronoun removes the variation, with the sentence grammatical on the bound read-
ing for the majority of speakers:
(4) Johni read [DP books about HIMi] (Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981)
Equally importantly, for many speakers, Fiengo and Higginbotham report that the grammati-
cality of (4) is in robust contrast to (5), where the pronoun is unstressed and reduced to ’im.3
(5) *Johni read [DP books about ’imi] (Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981)
3As noted above, binding judgements into picture-DPs generally seem to paint an unclear picture. My own
judgement is that (5) is not especially ungrammatical.
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The reason for the attested variation in sentences such as (3) may be that the prosodic
contour is not indicated: speakers might simply be judging different sentences. Regardless of
this, (4) and (5) appear to show that, at least for many speakers, a phonological factor influences
whether or not the picture-DP constitutes a local binding domain for the pronoun inside it.
However, a possible objection is that the effect is not due to phonological stress per se, but
due to a related semantic effect, like focus: the pronoun is focussed in (4), but not (3). On the
assumption that focus is encoded in LF representations, if Condition B were to apply at LF the
contrast between (4) and (5) for many speakers could be (at least in principle) explained by an
interaction of focus with Condition B.
Remaining with picture-DPs for the moment, Fiengo and Higginbotham (1981) also sug-
gest that the specificity of a picture-DP determines whether the picture-DP constitues a local
domain for Condition B. They observe a contrast between the ungrammatical (5) and an equiv-
alent sentence with a demonstrative determiner:
(6) Johni read [DP that book about ’imi] (Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981)
However, it may not be the specificity of the determiner which is the crucial factor. Hestvik
(1990) reports a contrast (at least to some degree for many speakers) between the ungrammati-
cal (7a) and the grammatical (7b):4
(7) a. %Johni saw a picture of himi
b. Johni saw some pictures of himi
Nor can the number distinction between (7a) and (7b) be the source of the contrast, since when
a null indefinite plural determiner is employed, the Condition B data pattern with the singular
picture-DP in (7a) rather than the plural one in (7b):
4Given the observations above concerning the stress assigned to the pronouns themselves in these construc-
tions, we will assume that the pronoun receives neutral stress. On this prosody I do not find (7a) ungrammatical,
though it is somewhat worse when the pronoun is reduced to ’im, consistent with the observations of Fiengo and
Higginbotham reported above.
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(8) %Johni saw pictures of himi
Hestvik observes a similar pattern in Norwegian. The Norwegian simplex expression (SE)
reflexive seg is capable of inducing a Condition B effect if bound too locally. (9a) is thus ruled
out in much the same manner as the non-reflexive pronoun is ruled out in (9b):
(9) a. *Joni
Johni
snakket
talked
om
about
segi
SEi
b. ?*Vi
We
fortalte
told
Joni
Johni
om
about
hami
himi
(Norwegian)
Returning now to Hestvik’s ‘specificity’ contrast in Condition B effects, take the following
Norwegian sentences.
(10) a. ??*Johni
Johni
liker
likes
bilder
pictures
av
of
segi
SEi
b. ??*Johni
Johni
fant
found
et
a
bilde
picture
av
of
segi
SEi
c. Johni
Johni
liker
likes
disse
these
bildene
pictures
av
of
segi
SEi
‘John likes these pictures of him(self)’ (Norwegian; Hestvik 1990)
The Condition B effect in the English (7a) and (8) for some speakers is reflected in the Norwe-
gian (10a) and (10b) respectively, while when a demonstrative is used in both (6) and (10c) the
Condition B effect is obviated. If, though, as the contrast between (7a) and (7b) suggests for
English, it is not specificity that is at stake, it may be some other property of DPs headed by
a or a null determiner that accounts for why they fail to create Condition B domains. Further-
more, Hestvik (1990: 78, fn.20) notes that some speakers find (10b) grammatical, reinforcing
the view that specificity is not necessarily the crucial factor. It is not unreasonable to speculate
that the phonological ‘lightness’ of these determiners coincides with the failure of the DPs that
they head to constitute a local binding domain. We could then suggest that for the speakers who
judge (10b) grammatical, the improved acceptability over (10a) could be because an overt de-
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terminer et (‘a’) ensures that the DP is a still ‘heavier’ phonological domain and so is somehow
capable of constituting a Condition B domain, just as in (10c) with a (phonologically heavier)
demonstrative.
While grammaticality judgments of bound pronouns in picture-DPs are somewhat vari-
able across speakers, further evidence that the phonological ‘weight’ of a constituent has some
effect in determining its behaviour as a binding domain can be found in Norwegian. Recall
that in Norwegian both pronouns and the SE reflexive seg induce Condition B effects. Hellan
(1988) notes that Condition B effects attested with both non-reflexive pronouns and the SE
reflexive disappear when the constituent containing them is made phonologically heavier. For
example, compare (9a) with (11a) and (9b) with (11b):5
(11) a. Joni
Johni
snakket
talked
om
about
segi
SEi
og
and
sinei
SE’si
gjerninger
deeds
‘John talked about himself and his deeds.’
b. Vi
We
fortalte
told
Joni
Johni
om
about
hami
himi
og
and
hansi
hisi
kusine
cousin
‘We told John about himself and his cousin.’ (Norwegian; Hellan 1988)
Further data with the possessive reflexive sin support this view. (12a) is also assumed to be
ruled out by Condition B, yet according to Hellan the same structural configuration gives rise
to no Condition B effect when the DP is made heavier with additional lexical material, as in
(12b) and (12c):
(12) a. *Joni
Johni
er
is
sini
SEi.POSS
fiende
enemy REFL selfi
b. Joni
Johni
er
is
sini
SEi.POSS
egen
own
fiende
enemy
‘John is his own enemy.’
5The same effect appears to arise in English, too:
(i) *Johni talked about himi
(ii) Johni talked about himi and hisi mother
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c. Joni
Johni
er
is
sini
SEi.POSS
aller
very
verste
worst
fiende
enemy
‘John is his very worst enemy.’ (Hellan 1988)
We can conclude that the source of both these contrasts and those found in the picture-DPs with
different determiners is the phonological ‘weight’ of the constituent (in a sense which remains
to be properly clarified, though this is not crucial for the purposes of this article). An LF
binding theory could not successfully accommodate such data, since phonological properties
are not encoded in LF-representations.6
2.2.3 Case and inflectional features affect Condition B
It is not simply phonological properties that are assumed to be absent in LF representations.
In standard versions of Minimalism (Chomsky 1993 et seq.), it is assumed that certain mor-
phosyntactic features are not interpreted (or interpretable) by LF. It follows (from the Full
Interpretation principle) that LF representations cannot contain such features. For Chomsky,
these include [φ] when not semantically interpreted (on T and v, for example) and [CASE].
Once we examine crosslinguistic data from other Germanic languages, it becomes apparent
that these features interact with the possibility of bound readings for pronouns, a fact which is
difficult to reconcile with an analysis of Condition B that applies at LF.
As outlined by Hoekstra (1994), Frisian has a 3rd person singular feminine pronoun har
and a 3rd person plural pronoun har(ren). Both may be locally bound without inducing a
Condition B effect (somewhat unusually for non-reflexive 3rd person pronouns):
(13) a. Hjai
Theyi
skammen
shamed
har(ren)i
themi
‘They were ashamed of themselves.’ (Frisian; Hoekstra 1994)
b. Mariei
Maryi
wasket
washes
hari
heri
6In fact, it is also very difficult for a narrow-syntactic binding theory to explain why phonological properties
may be relevant to Condition B. See Hicks (2006) for a narrow-syntactic reinterpretation of Condition B that is
potentially capable of capturing such data.
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‘Mary washes (herself).’ (Frisian; Reuland and Everaert 2001)
However, it is not the case that Condition B is simply not operative in Frisian, since this effect
does not hold for other 3rd person pronouns:
(14) a. Hjai
Theyi
skammen
shamed
*sei
*themi
(Frisian; Hoekstra 1994)
b. Mariei
Maryi
wasket
washes
*sei
*heri
(Frisian; Reuland and Everaert 2001)
Hoekstra (1994) shows that the difference between har(ren) and se lies in their Case specifi-
cation: se, which is assigned structural Case, gives rise to Condition B effects, while har(ren),
which is assigned inherent Case, does not. Yet the requirement for a structural Case feature in
order to be subject to Condition B could not be incorporated into a version of Condition B that
applies at LF, since the relevant feature is not present in LF representations.
Case also plays a role in Condition B effects in Icelandic. In ECM constructions, Ice-
landic typically behaves like English in not permitting a pronominal ECM subject to be bound
by the matrix subject:
(15) Maríai
Maryi
taldi
believed
*hanai
*heri
vera
be
gáfaða
gifted
(Icelandic; Taraldsen 1996)
However, some Icelandic verbs assign a lexically selected oblique (‘quirky’) Case to their sub-
jects, resulting in nominative Case assignment to their object or to the ECM subject. In contrast
to (15), when the pronoun is an ECM subject assigned nominative Case, it can be bound by the
quirky subject (Taraldsen 1996):
(16) Maríui
Maryi-DAT
fannst
thought-3SG
húni
shei-NOM
vera
be
gáfuð
gifted
‘Mary thought she was gifted.’ (Icelandic; Taraldsen 1996)
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The interaction between agreement inflections and Condition B effects in Icelandic provides
us with a similar argument against an LF approach to Condition B. Since Icelandic quirky
subjects do not trigger agreement with their verbs, the verbal morphology either consists of
a default 3rd person singular inflection, or is governed by the φ-features of the nominative
object (Thráinsson 1979). As highlighted by Taraldsen (1995) (following an observation due
to Höskuldur Thráinsson), verbal morphology may be critical in determining whether the ECM
subject induces a Condition B violation when bound by the matrix subject:
(17) a. Konunumi
women-thei-DAT
fundust
seemed-3PL
*þæri
*theyi-NOM
vera
be
gáfaþar
gifted-FEM.PL-NOM
‘The women thought they were smart.’
b. Konunumi
women-thei-DAT
fannst
seemed-3SG
þæri
theyi-NOM
vera
be
gáfaþar
gifted-FEM.PL-NOM
‘The women thought they were smart.’ (Taraldsen 1995)
When the nominative ECM subject governs the verbal agreement, as in (17a), the bound inter-
pretation is ruled out by Condition B; when default 3rd person singular morphology appears
on the verb, the Condition B effect disappears, as in (17b). Thus, Condition B is again shown
to be sensitive to morphosyntactic information (here, inflectional features) that is commonly
assumed not to be accessible at LF.7
3. Counter-evidence 1: trapping effects
For the reasons outlined in section 2.1 above, I follow Hornstein (2000) in assuming that all else
being equal, a syntactic approach to binding is preferred over the LF approach. While empirical
7Envisaging a binding theory that applies at LF, Taraldsen (1995) supposes that (17a) and (17b) involve dif-
ferent structural positions for the ECM subject at LF. He suggests that an agreeing ECM subject raises covertly
to the Specifier of a Number Agreement head in the matrix clause. It is this covert movement which then brings
the pronoun into a configuration in violation of Condition B. However, this explanation does not sit comfortably
with more recent Minimalist assumptions. Agreement heads are commonly considered not not legitimate syntac-
tic objects due to an absence of any interpretable features borne by them (Chomsky 1995b), and more recently,
agreement is determined at long distance in probe-goal configurations (without movement) by the operation Agree
(Chomsky 2000 et seq.).
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evidence from Condition B effects supports this view, to confirm that binding relations are
determined in narrow syntax rather than at LF we must show that a narrow-syntactic version
of Condition A fares at least as well as the LF approach in terms of its empirical coverage.
The rest of this article teases apart and tests the predictions of the two competing approaches
with respect to interactions between anaphor binding and other interpretive phenomena. This
has proved a key battleground in the argument for where the binding theory applies, and the
putative interactions are often taken as evidence that Condition A applies at LF. First I deal with
cases where an anaphor embedded in a moved constituent is trapped in a ‘high’ position for the
purposes of interpretation, due to other factors in the sentence; this is known as a ‘trapping
effect’.
3.1 Condition C interacting with anaphor binding
It is reported that trapping effects are observed in the interaction between Condition A and
Condition C,8 sometimes adduced in favour of the conclusion that Condition A applies at LF. It
is well known that Condition C displays different behaviour according to whether the relevant
R-expression is embedded in an adjunct or a complement:9
(18) a. [Which argument [that Johni made]]k did hei believe tk
b. *[Which argument [that Johni is a genius]]k did hei believe tk
Chomsky (1993) follows Lebeaux’s (1988) conclusion that adjuncts may be ‘late-merged’ in
the derivation, avoiding a Condition C violation. Under this approach, in (18a), the wh-phrase
which argument merges as the object of believe, and then undergoes wh-movement. Only at
this stage does the relative that John made merge, acyclically. At no point during the deriva-
tion is Condition C violated (as John never c-commands him), and the R-expression contained
8I do not commit myself here to the status of Condition C or where its effects are determined. It is sometimes
assumed that Condition C as a syntactic condition can be dispensed with (Chomsky 1982; Reinhart 1983a,b;
Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993; Reinhart and Reuland 1993).
9See especially van Riemsdijk and Williams 1981; Freidin 1986; Lebeaux 1988. Sportiche (2006) highlights
that speaker judgements show some degree of variation for some putative adjunct/complement asymmetries.
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within the relative clause will not be able reconstruct to the base position of the wh-phrase:
the sentence is correctly predicted grammatical. This option is not available in (18b) since the
clause containing the R-expression is the complement of argument, and so must merge with
argument to satisfy its thematic requirements. Hence, John, contained within the complement
clause, must also merge before wh-movement takes place. Coreference between John and he
results in a violation of Condition C, since he c-commands John before wh-movement takes
place. When the clause inside the wh-phrase is a relative, as in (18a), it is assumed that a
choice can in principle be made whether to merge the relative before or after wh-movement. In
(18a) we are forced to choose the latter since merging the relative clause before wh-movement
would induce a Condition C violation, just as in (18b).
In other cases, the presence of an anaphor within a DP-internal constituent could force
a syntactic analysis in which that constituent is merged cyclically (before wh-movement), in
order to ensure that an anaphor which is not c-commanded by its antecedent in its surface
position is c-commanded by it at some earlier stage of the derivation. The grammaticality of
(19) confirms that this is possible.
(19) [Which stories about each other]k did the journalists publish tk
Suppose, though, that the adjunct also contains an R-expression, which results in a Condition
C violation if the adjunct reconstructs (i.e. is merged before wh-movement). Sportiche (2006)
suggests that such cases provide evidence of the interaction of Condition A with Condition C,
which he argues applies at LF (if not also elsewhere). As predicted, then, (20) is ungrammatical
as at LF we must either violate Condition C (with reconstruction) or Condition A (with late-
merger and hence no reconstruction).
(20) *[Which stories about each other’si characterizations of the typical male viewerj]k
would hej conclude the journalistsi should publish tk (Sportiche 2006)
Sportiche contrasts (20) with (21). It appears that when reconstruction for Condition A does
not induce a Condition C violation, the sentence is grammatical:
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(21) [Which stories about each other’si characterizations of himj]k would the typical male
viewerj conclude the journalistsi should publish tk (Sportiche 2006)
The difference is explained as follows. In (20), reconstruction of the wh-phrase brings the
typical male viewer into a configuration in which it is c-commanded by he, in violation of
Condition C. In (21), however, reconstruction brings the pronoun into a configuration in which
it is c-commanded by the the typical male viewer. So rather than Condition C we are dealing
with Condition B in (21), which is satisfied since the the typical male viewer is not sufficiently
local to the pronoun.
Sportiche appears to assume that that reference to reconstruction possibilities at LF is
required in order to explain the Condition A data: some constituent containing the anaphor
needs to be reconstructed at LF in order for the anaphor to be locally bound, while this also
induces a Condition C violation at LF, since he then c-commands the typical male viewer. Yet
it is not strictly true that a binding theory that applies at LF is directly supported by this data.
Presumably, each other’s characterizations... must be an argument of stories, and so here there
is no possibility for late merger. In (20), then, there will be a stage of the derivation at which
he c-commands the typical male viewer. This, it seems, is enough to induce a Condition C
violation in any case, so independently of reconstruction possibilities, (20) must be ruled out,
just as (22) is:
(22) *[Which stories about the typical male vieweri]k does hei want tk published?
As is well known (see, e.g., Lebeaux 1998), interpreting an R-expression in a ‘high’ position
cannot save a derivation in which Condition C was violated before A′-movement.10 It seems,
then, that contra Sportiche, (20) in fact tells us nothing about the interaction of Condition A
with Condition C, since it is ruled out for exactly the same reason as an equivalent sentence
with no anaphor, like (22): about+DP is not an adjunct, but rather the complement of stories.
10Though Lebeaux (1998) highlights that A-movement of a constituent containing an R-expression can save a
derivation in which the R-expression was previously in a Condition C configuration; Lebeaux terms this the ‘hole
in Condition C’.
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A reviewer notes that it is possible to construct equivalent sentences that involve both
an anaphor and an R-expression contained within a complement to the noun, as opposed to
within an adjunct. Proposing (23), the reviewer suggests that such cases do exhibit the relevant
contrast, predicted by a binding theory that applies at LF:
(23) a. [Which stories [that each other’sj friends told himi]]k should Johni assume that
his childrenj like tk?
b. *[Which stories [that each other’sj friends told Johni]]k should hei assume that
his childrenj like tk?
However, such examples are problematic for reasons independent of any Condition C/Condition
A interaction. Reinhart and Reuland (1993), Hornstein (2000), and Hicks (2006) show that
reciprocals in certain syntactic positions exhibit properties equivalent to those of nonlocally
bound reflexives in English (sometimes termed ‘logophors’). Hornstein (2000: 186) and Hicks
(2006: 140) provide examples suggesting that reciprocals embedded within the subject of a fi-
nite clause exhibit these nonlocal properties. For a number of speakers, nonlocal reflexives and
reciprocals are judged as marginal or ungrammatical. Nonlocal reflexives and reciprocals are
characterised by not requiring an antecedent that allows Condition A to be satisfied: they are
subject to different principles of interpretation. By many binding theories, then, the reciprocal
embedded within a subject position is not treated as a locally bound anaphor. A further com-
plication with the evidence provided by (23) for Condition A applying at LF is that the contrast
between (23a) and (23b) does not seem to be nearly as sharp as the original contrast presented
by Sportiche (2006). In fact, in both (23a) and (23b) I find the reciprocal hard to link to the
required antecedent.11
11However, even if the contrast between (23a) and (23b) is robust for some speakers, and even if the reciprocal
is of the type that requires local binding, given the modification to anaphor binding proposed in section 4 below,
the contrast could still be explained without resorting to a version of Condition A that applies at LF.
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3.2 Quantifier scope interacting with A-movement across an anaphor
Trapping effects are rather more robustly observed in the interaction of Condition A with quan-
tifier interpretation. As noted by Aoun (1982) and Hornstein (1995) among others, raising
a quantifier DP across an unmoved anaphor bound by it results in a trapping effect for the
purposes of scope interpretation of the raised DP.12 In (24), from Fox (2000: 145), two scope
alternations are possible (though ∃ > ∀ is pragmatically implausible of course, requiring one
or more soldiers to each die in more than one battle):
(24) [At least one soldier]i seems (to Napoleon) [ti to be likely to die in every battle].
∀ > ∃ ; ∃ > ∀
When the experiencer is an anaphor (or a bound pronoun, as in (25b)), however, the pragmati-
cally plausible inverse scope reading disappears.13
(25) a. [At least one soldier]i seems to himselfi [ti to be likely to die in every battle].
*∀ > ∃ ; ∃ > ∀
b. [At least one soldier]i seems to hisi commanders [ti to be likely to die in every
battle]. *∀ > ∃ ; ∃ > ∀
Unless the anaphor has to be bound by its antecedent at LF, we cannot explain why the inverse
scope reading is impossible. Note that narrow-syntactic approaches would not naturally predict
this. Presumably, once an anaphor has been linked to its antecedent, the binding relation is
established and reconstruction should not be able to tamper with it.
12Aoun (1982: 31-2, fn.7) attributes this observation to Luigi Rizzi, noting that this provides support for a
binding theory which applies at LF, rather than at S-structure.
13Lebeaux (1998); Fox (2000); Wurmbrand and Bobaljik (1999) take this as evidence that the inverse scope
reading is not derived from long distance Quantifier-Raising of the universal in the embedded clause, since other-
wise the trapping effect in (25a) is unexplained.
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4. A modification to the analysis of Condition A effects
This effect is robust, strikingly, in a way that the data from the supporting arguments for Con-
dition A at LF (below) are not. If we wish to maintain that a narrow-syntactic binding theory
is the ideal we must do some work in explaining why LF-positions of the anaphor appear to
be relevant. Fox (2000: 146, fn.9) hints that Lebeaux’s (1998: 11) conclusion that a single
LF representation must be the input to Condition A and quantifier scope interpretation is not
necessarily correct. Leaving aside Condition A for a moment, note that exactly the same pre-
diction would arise from simply stating that an anaphor must be c-commanded (regardless of
how locally) by its antecedent at LF. Moreover, adopting an LF approach to Condition A of
course offers no explanation for the appearance of the trapping effect in (25b), where a bound
pronoun appears in the place of the anaphor. Clearly, in order to explain the trapping effect in
(25b) we need a constraint independent of the classical binding theory, requiring variables to
be in the scope of (i.e. c-commanded by) their binders at LF. Since anaphors are obligatorily
bound variables, this constraint will also explain the absence of an inverse scope reading in
(25a), independently of Condition A.
I suggest, then, that trapping effects have nothing to do with Condition A, strictly speak-
ing.14 Anaphor binding is then governed by two principles:
(26) Constraints governing anaphor binding:
a. Bound variables must be in the scope of their binder at LF.15
b. An anaphor must be bound during narrow syntax by an antecedent which is suffi-
ciently local to it.
14This possibility has been explored in previous work. Romero (1998) adopts the proposal of an earlier draft
of Lebeaux (1998) that i) Condition A must be met at some stage of the derivation, and ii) anaphors must be
c-commanded at LF: “anaphor licensing is not just a matter of Principle A but also a matter of scope” (Romero
1998: 356). I do not have access to this draft, but this is clearly not how the argument is presented in Lebeaux
(1998), where Condition A is argued to apply at LF.
15Here I have chosen ‘in the scope of’ rather than ‘c-commanded by’ since as highlighted below, not quite all
variable binding appears to involve strict c-command.
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For the moment we will refer to the latter as Condition A; its precise formulation need not con-
cern us here. Crucially, (26) makes two different empirical predictions from any LF approach
to Condition A:
i) An anaphor will be ungrammatical if not c-commanded by its antecedent both in narrow
syntax and at LF.
ii) Local c-command need not hold between an anaphor and its antecedent at LF.
One criticism of the approach to anaphor binding in (26) could be that it introduces a
redundancy with respect to c-command. The requirement that the antecedent c-command the
anaphor holds both during narrow syntax (due to Condition A) and also at LF (for successful
variable binding). While this is perhaps a technical inelegance, there is empirical evidence
that the apparent redundancy really should be there: I suggest that this is in fact an advantage
over the LF-only view of Condition A. As first noted (to my knowledge) by Reinhart (1976,
1983b), some well-known cases of variable binding do not in fact involve surface c-command.
As Hornstein (1995: 118) notes, typically a non-c-commanding quantifier can bind a variable
if it is either the subject of a DP or embedded inside an adjunct PP.
(27) a. [[Every girl’s]i father] thinks shei’s a genius (Kayne 1994)
b. [Someone [from every cityi]] loves iti (Hornstein 1995)
c. [The owner of [every car in the street]i] should move iti on Mondays
(Reuland 1998)
Similarly, other phenomena assumed to require c-command at LF in order to be licensed show
the same behaviour, like Negative Polarity Items:
(28) [[No-one’s] ticket] will be worth anything if the manager decides to rest all the best
players.
We might suppose, then, that in a way that is perhaps not properly understood,16 the c-command
16See, e.g., Kayne (1994); Hornstein (1995); Reuland (1998) for suggestions. For example, Hornstein
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requirement on certain licensing procedures at LF can be slightly relaxed somehow. Yet it
is also well known that the c-command requirement is stricter on anaphors than on bound
pronouns: anaphors must be strictly c-commanded by their antecedent.
(29) *[[Every girl’s]i father] admires herselfi (Kayne 1994)
If both Condition A and the constraint on binding variables simply hold at LF then this fact is
unusual: movement of every girl to the edge of the clause should allow it to locally c-command
the anaphor, satisfying Condition A if it were to apply at LF. Yet if anaphors on the other hand
must be both bound at LF and locally c-commanded by their antecedent during narrow syntax,
then we have an explanation for the ungrammaticality of (29).
It should be noted here that Kayne (1994) questions whether the c-command requirement
for anaphors really is as strict as it appears. Kayne provides the following examples where the
c-commanding DP is not an appropriate antecedent for the anaphor (unlike cases such as (29),
which Kayne concedes are ungrammatical). This is supposed to make the sentences somehow
more grammatical:17
(30) a. ?[[Every girl’si] room] contains a picture of herselfi
b. ?[[Everyone’si room] suited himselfi
(1995: 25-26) suggests that the binder for the pronoun undergoes Quantifier Raising (QR) into a position which
c-commands the pronoun, rectifying the c-command configuration, which must hold at LF. While this may be
plausible to account for some of the data (though apparently not why quantifier DP complements do not show the
same behaviour), the particular account adopted is not crucial for the point I wish to make here. See also Hornstein
(1995: 118-122) for further possibilities for analysis.
17It is not clear to me how exactly the presence of a ‘potential antecedent’ can be used to determine the gram-
maticality of the anaphor in terms of a distinction between (29) and (30b). The intuition, as Hornstein (1995)
reports, is that every girl’s father is closer to the anaphor herself than every girl’s, hence the ungrammaticality
of (29). On the other hand, everyone’s room is not a potential antecedent for the anaphor himself, hence there is
less of an interference. But why is it not a potential antecedent? An inanimate DP can of course bind an anaphor,
if only itself. Animacy cannot be responsible, so what about a φ-feature mismatch between everyone’s room and
himself ? This cannot be the case either, since this would also rule out (29), where every girl’s father and herself
mismatch.
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However, it could well be that for speakers who find these sentences acceptable to some degree,
the possibility of interpreting the reflexive as a ‘logophor’ (a type of often stressed reflexive pro-
noun which does not necessarily require a syntactic antecedent) interferes with the judgments.
I believe that this is supported by a significant contrast for many speakers between the relative
acceptability of (30a) and (30b). Logophoric reflexives are particularly common in the object
position of picture-DPs as in (30a), which is certainly not entirely ungrammatical for me. On
the other hand, all native speakers I have consulted find (30b) ungrammatical. I suggest that
this is because reflexives as objects of transitive verbs cannot typically be logophors for most
speakers, always requiring a local c-commanding antecedent.
5. Counter-evidence 2: idiom interpretation
Locality is the key difference between the narrow-syntactic approach to Condition A and an LF
approach: the LF approach predicts that local c-command must hold at LF, while the syntactic
approach does not. While Lebeaux (1998) concedes that Condition B must apply throughout
the derivation rather than at LF, he nevertheless argues strongly against Condition A also ap-
plying during the derivation. Lebeaux proposes that a bundle of conditions related to semantic
interpretation apply at a single level, LF: quantifier (scope) interpretation, bound pronoun inter-
pretation, Condition A, and idiom interpretation. I have argued above that Condition A should
not come under this group, but that the relevant aspect of anaphor binding which should do is
subsumed by bound variable interpretation. We have assumed that quantifier interpretation also
applies at LF, and seen that evidence from scope trapping effects is at least consistent with my
approach. Our attention now turns to the evidence in the literature against it.
5.1 Subjectless picture-DP idiom chunks
Chomsky (1993) devises an argument that idiom interpretation is determined by reconstruction
at LF to support his assumption that the binding conditions also apply there.
(31) Johni wondered [[which picture of himselfi/j]k Billj took tk] (Chomsky 1993)
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When take pictures has a literal reading (i.e. carrying them away), in previous frameworks it
was possible to say that (31) showed that Condition A could be met either at D-structure (with
Bill the antecedent) or at S-structure (with John the antecedent). Chomsky’s claim is that even
if D-structure and S-structure are eliminated, these two readings could instead arise from two
different LF representations for (31), i.e. (32a) or (32b):
(32) a. John wondered [which picture of himself] [Bill took which picture of himself]
b. John wondered [which picture of himself] [Bill took which picture of
himself]
However, when the predicate take pictures is interpreted idiomatically (i.e. with a camera),
the only possible reading is the one where the reflexive is bound by the embedded subject.18
Chomsky claims that on the idiomatic reading, take a picture of himself has to be interpreted
at LF as a syntactic unit, so reconstruction is forced. So a reconstructed interpretation for the
idiom chunk containing the anaphor results in the same type of trapping effect as seen above.
We might wonder whether there could be another explanation though. It has been suggested on
several occasions (see Lebeaux 1998; Bhatt and Pancheva 2001; Fox and Nissenbaum 2004,
and particularly Safir 1999) that there could be syntactic differences between the idiomatic
construction and the literal one: it could be that the picture-DP in the idiomatic construction
has a PRO subject controlled by the subject of take, as in (33).
(33) Johni wondered [which PROj picture of himselfj]k [Billj took tk]
If so, regardless of any reconstruction of the wh-phrase, it will always contain a PRO which
acts as the antecedent of the reflexive. Since PRO must be interpreted as coreferent with the
subject of take pictures, this explains why the anaphor in that construction cannot be bound by
the matrix subject.
18Note that Lasnik and Hendrick (2003) are ‘unconvinced’ that there is a significant contrast in the crucial
sentences with the idiomatic and non-idiomatic readings of take pictures.
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If (33) is plausible, such cases tell us nothing about whether or not Condition A applies
at LF: the binding domain for the anaphor in question is its minimal DP, so the wh-movement
of that DP is irrelevant to binding. Condition B effects suggest that the PRO analysis is in-
deed plausible, as the idiomatic take pictures also differs from the literal reading in terms of
Condition B. Assume that pronouns have to be free in their minimal DP. On the literal reading
of (34a), the grammaticality of the bound reading for the pronoun follows. On the idiomatic
reading though, the equivalent interpretation is ungrammatical, only explained as a Condition
B violation if a PRO subject is inside the DP, as in (34b).19
(34) a. Johni took [DP several pictures of himi]
b. *Johni took [DP several PROi pictures of himi]
An argument for Condition A at LF from ‘creation verbs’ (e.g. compose songs and in-
vent jokes) receives a similar explanation. Building on work by Heycock (1995), Fox and
Nissenbaum (2004) assume that creation verbs by their very nature require reconstructed LFs
when their object wh-moves. Since these predicates force reconstruction, if Condition A ap-
plies at LF we expect ungrammaticality when the requirements of Condition A and creation
verb interpretation clash, i.e where wh-phrase reconstruction is obligatory but where Condition
A requires the wh-phrase that it is embedded in to have the surface interpretation in order to
meet locality requirements:20
19Bhatt and Pancheva (2001) suggest that more generally, in cases where a matrix verb’s semantics require
its agent to corefer with subject of its DP complement, a PRO subject is obligatory. This correctly predicts the
following contrast:
(i) *Johni told [DP PROi lies about himi]
(ii) Johni heard [DP rumours about himi]
20While the judgments seem pretty clear to me, it is worth highlighting that (35a) is extremely odd, implying that
ideas are quantifiable, and that the quantity is somehow perceivable. It seems to me that any possible answer like
Mary is likely to have four ideas about John would be pragmatically extremely bizarre (for reasons independent
of the binding theory).
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(35) a. I asked Johni how many ideas about himselfi Mary is likely to {hear about/*have}
b. I asked the boysi how many jokes about each otheri Mary is likely to {retell/*invent}
(Fox and Nissenbaum 2004)
In (35a), have (ideas) is a creation verb, while hear about (ideas) is not; in (35b), invent (jokes)
is a creation verb, while retell (ideas) is not. As Fox and Nissenbaum (2004: 479) concede, we
might equally assume that creation predicates force a PRO subject in their DP complement. As
before, it seems highly plausible that picture-DPs contain a PRO subject when the agent of the
picture-noun has to be interpreted as the subject of the predicate which selects it.21 This takes
away the argument from idiom and creation verb interpretation that Condition A applies at LF.
5.2 Picture-DP idiom chunks containing subjects
Lebeaux (1998) claims that in some idiom constructions, no PRO subject analysis will be avail-
able, as the position PRO occupies must already be filled:
(36) a. Sue and Bill wondered [how much of each other’s minds]i Mary and John blew
ti
b. It was [DP each other’s shoulders]i that the boys said ti that the girls cried on ti
c. It was [DP each other’s heads]i that John and Mary said ti that Bill and Sue turned
ti (Lebeaux 1998)
The crucial question is whether the binding of the reciprocal always has to be by the deepest
embedded subject, so by Mary and John in (36a), the girls in (36b), and Bill and Sue in (36c).
During the derivation, in each sentence the anaphor reaches a position in which it can be bound
by the higher antecedent (in the final position in (36a) and in the intermediate trace position
in (36b)/(36c)). Yet idiom interpretation would require the interpretation of the lowest copy
21I do not commit myself here to a particular theory of PRO interpretation, nor to the stage of the derivation at
which PRO interpretation is determined. (Presumably, the choices will be the same as for anaphor binding; narrow
syntax or LF.) There are too many (well known) differences between PRO and anaphors for me to suggest here
that a narrow-syntactic approach to binding can naturally be extended to accommodate control.
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of the DP which contains the anaphor. After reconstruction, the anaphor would remain in the
c-command domain of the higher antecedent, while it would only be in the local c-command
domain of the lower antecedent. So if Condition A applies at LF, only the lower reading should
be possible for the anaphor. But if only bound variable interpretation is required at LF, then the
higher reading should remain possible. Lebeaux (1998) claims that in each case only the lower
antecedent is possible, supporting his conclusion that Condition A applies at LF. Here I simply
disagree with Lebeaux’s judgment, and many speakers feel no preference at all for the lower
reading over the higher one. If so, and idiom interpretation does require reconstruction, then
these sentences provide evidence that only bound variable interpretation (and not Condition A)
applies at LF.22
6. Counter-evidence 3: Reconstruction with expletive associates
Fox and Nissenbaum (2004) look for a different sort of example involving reconstruction, but
like Lebeaux, where there can be no suggestion of PRO interfering in the test. They come up
with (37):
(37) a. I asked John how many books about him Mary thinks there are in the library
b. I asked John how many books about himself Mary thinks {are in the library/*there
are in the library}
In (37b), we have two options in the embedded clause: to use an expletive construction or
not. Fox and Nissenbaum assume that in how many questions with an expletive there, recon-
struction of the wh-phrase is forced, for reasons related to the definiteness restriction on the
associate. So by assumption the wh-phrase has to reconstruct to its pre-movement position
22Alternatively, as David Adger (p.c.) suggests, these predicates are simply not idiomatic in the relevant way
and hence do not require reconstruction. This still of course takes away Lebeaux’s argument that Condition A
applies at LF, but does not then offer particular support for my alternative. Indeed, based on the analysis of certain
DPs and their movements at LF proposed by Diesing (1992), Runner (2002) argues that certain constructions
involving idioms such as this cannot be assumed to form a complete unit at LF as Chomsky (1993) assumes. See
also Sportiche (2006) for further arguments against idiom reconstruction.
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in the LF representation. Assuming that reconstruction really is obligatory, my approach to
Condition A and the LF-only approach make separate predictions. On the LF-only approach,
reconstruction of the wh-phrase results in a configuration which is in violation of Condition A,
since the anaphor is not sufficiently locally bound. On my approach, no violation follows, since
Condition A would be met in narrow-syntax, and reconstruction still leaves the anaphor in a
position c-commanded by its antecedent, satisfying the condition on bound variables. So the
LF-only approach predicts (37b) to be ungrammatical with the expletive construction, while
my approach predicts that there should be no difference between the construction with the ex-
pletive and the one without. While Fox and Nissenbaum (2004) claim the judgment for (37b)
supports the former, once again the crucial judgment seems highly contentious. I feel that there
is simply no contrast whatsoever, a view supported by Uchiumi (2006), whose survey of native
speakers found both (37a) and (37b) to be judged within the acceptable range. As Uchiumi
concludes, the conclusions that Fox and Nissenbaum draw based on these data fall some way
short of being convincing.
7. Counter-evidence 4: Reconstruction with bound pronouns
Fox and Nissenbaum (2004) go on to provide an apparently more robust empirical argument for
Condition A at LF. This time it comes from the interaction of Condition A with bound variable
interpretation of pronouns. The crucial sentence is (38a).
(38) His aides should have explained to President Clintoni...
a. *...[what kinds of pictures of himselfi and herj baby] no motherj wants to see
b. ...[what kinds of pictures of himselfi and herj baby] Mrs Jonesj wants to see
They assume that the ungrammaticality of the bound reading for the pronoun in (38a) is the
result of two contradictory requirements: reconstruction having to apply so that the bound
pronoun is c-commanded at LF, but not being able to apply since this would induce a Condition
A violation—if, of course, Condition A also applies at LF. In (38b) on the other hand, we are
dealing with a coreferential pronoun rather than a bound one and so there is no requirement for
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reconstruction, and Condition A is met at LF. The problem for the approach to anaphor binding
in (26) is that if Condition A applies in narrow syntax, then it is met in (38a) after movement,
while reconstruction of the wh-phrase still leaves the anaphor in a position c-commanded by its
antecedent: the sentence is incorrectly predicted to be grammatical.
The judgments here are not as sharp for me, and I find (38b) less than perfect. Some
speakers I have consulted find no contrast, with both sentences being acceptable. Indeed, Uchi-
umi (2006) reports that some of his consultants judged (38a) as worse than (38b), some judged
them the other way around, and some perceived no contrast at all. This high degree of speaker
variation in these sentences leads me to suspect that the example might be more complicated
than Fox and Nissenbaum assume. As noted above, typically judgments become quite variable
when the reflexive in question is logophoric, rather than a locally bound anaphor. It is well
known that when a picture-DP has no subject, the reflexive object of the picture-noun may ex-
hibit certain properties suggesting that the reflexive may not be a true anaphor. Therefore in
(38), in theory we could be dealing with a logophor, and these are not subject to Condition A.
Fox and Nissenbaum concede this much, but claim that logophoric reflexives do not typically
take objects as their antecedents. They claim that choosing President Clinton as the object of
the matrix clause rather than the subject removes the possibility that we could be dealing with
a logophor, and so Condition A really is at stake here. However, things are more complicated
still, since logophors can also take non-c-commanding antecedents:
(39) Max’si eyes watched eagerly a new picture of himselfi in the paper
(Reinhart and Reuland 1991)
Fox and Nissenbaum apparently fail to notice that in (38) there is another potential antecedent
for a logophoric reflexive, namely the pronoun his, which corefers with President Clinton.
So what we might have in this sentence is not an anaphor bound by President Clinton but a
logophor which takes the pronoun his as an antecedent. To check, we need to eliminate the
latter possibility, as in (40).
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(40) The senators should have explained to President Clintoni...
a. ??...[what kinds of pictures of himselfi and herj baby] no motherj wants to see
b. ??...[what kinds of pictures of himselfi and herj baby] Mrs Jonesj wants to see
I am not entirely sure of my judgments on these, but it seems to me that (40a,b) are to some
extent worse than (38a,b); certainly, for me the contrast is blurred. The final thing I wish to
highlight in connection with these sentences is that very similar cases seem to differ unpre-
dictably in their acceptability. So although (38a) and (41) would be expected to show the same
effect, I find (41) considerably better.
(41) ??The fathers showed President Clintoni [which pictures of himselfi holding herj baby]
every motherj would want to see.
In short, the fluctuation in speaker judgments and the variation across similar sentences
points towards the possibility that the logophoric reflexive is interfering in the crucial contrasts.
In fact, Pollard and Sag (1992, 1994); Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and assume that all of the
classic connectivity effects in wh-movement constructions are instances of logophoric reflex-
ives. Note that in these cases, objects can also bind picture-DP reflexives in the left-edge of CP,
just as subjects can:
(42) a. Johni asked Mary which pictures of himselfi looked the best
b. John asked Maryj which pictures of herselfj looked the best
Under Fox and Nissenbaum’s assumptions about subject orientation of logophoric reflexives,
this evidence would be taken to support the view that that these are instances of locally bound
anaphors. However, this conclusion may be incorrect. First, some speakers simply do not
judge these sentences as grammatical, presumably since their grammar does not contain the
logophoric reflexive. Second, it appears that pragmatic factors may interfere with the (putative)
binding relation between the reflexive in the embedded clause and the antecedent in the matrix
clause, which of course is a well-known (if not well-understood) property of logophoric reflex-
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ives. Compare (42a) with (43a) and (42b) with (43b), where the locality relation between the
picture-DP reflexive and the subject binder is identical:
(43) a. ??Johni asked Maryj which pictures of himselfi shej liked best
b. *?Johni asked Maryj which pictures of herselfj hei should keep
The possibility of the matrix subject (43a) or object (43b) binding the reflexive is apparently
overridden if the wh-phrase has moved across an embedded subject coreferent with the matrix
object or subject respectively. Presumably this gives the embedded subject (and coreferent
matrix argument) some sort of higher discourse prominence, and so the logophoric reflexive is
degraded when bound by the less prominent argument. If we were indeed dealing with a true
anaphor in such cases, this sort of effect would not be explained at all. Clearly then, such factors
make it extremely difficult to be maintain that the original contrast that Fox and Nissenbaum
(2004) report for (38a,b) is significant. Even if it is, the chances are that we are not really
testing Condition A effects there in any case.
8. Conclusion
When it comes to figuring out where the binding theory applies, the stakes are highest when it
comes to Condition A, largely because the evidence for the binding theory applying at LF in
the first place is strongest from Condition A effects. For example, Lebeaux (1998), who claims
that Condition A applies at LF, nonetheless suggests that Conditions B and C apply during the
derivation rather than at LF. We have seen that various interpretive phenomena do not necessar-
ily interact with Condition A in the way that they are often assumed to if Condition A applies
at LF. Some interactions between interpretive phenomena and anaphor binding are indeed ro-
bustly observed, most notably in scope trapping effects when a quantifier DP is raised across
an anaphor bound by it. However, we have shown that the interacting factor with scope is not
Condition A (i.e. the requirement that an anaphor be locally c-commanded by its antecedent)
but rather an independent constraint that bound variables must be c-commanded at LF by their
binders: the same trapping effect is observed with bound pronouns in the place of anaphors.
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At the same time, we have only been able to draw tentative conclusions that a narrow-
syntactic version of Condition A makes more successful empirical predictions than the LF
approach. However, by no means do the two approaches to Condition A (and indeed, to the
binding theory in general) start out on an equal footing. As noted at the outset of the chapter,
empirical evidence for a narrow-syntactic Condition B strongly argues against an LF approach,
since its effects can be influenced by elements which cannot be present in LF representations:
we have seen various examples cross-linguistically showing that Condition B interacts with
Case features of pronouns, verbal agreement, and phonological factors. Importantly, theoreti-
cal concerns also lead us to strongly favour a narrow-syntactic approach, in particular because
it allows us to determine locality effects uniquely by syntactic factors, and allows more promis-
ing avenues for capturing crosslinguistic variation. Building on the findings of recent research
(Hornstein 2000; Kayne 2002; Zwart 2002, 2006; Hicks 2006), a possible reduction of the bind-
ing conditions to independent syntactic operations provides scope for a complete elimination
of the binding theory, and so the Minimalist ideal is within sight.
References
Aoun, J. (1982). On the logical nature of the binding principles: Quantifier lowering, dou-
ble raising of ‘there’, and the notion empty element. The Proceedings of the North East
Linguistic Society 12, 16–35.
Belletti, A. and L. Rizzi (1988). Psych-verbs and theta-theory. Natural Language and Linguis-
tic Theory 6, 291–352.
Bhatt, R. and R. Pancheva (2001). Implicit arguments. Ms., University of Texas, Austin and
USC.
Boeckx, C. (2001). Scope reconstruction and A-movement. Natural Language and Linguistic
Theory 19(3), 503–548.
Chomsky, N. (1973). Conditions on transformations. In S. A. Anderson and P. Kiparsky (Eds.),
A Festschrift for Morris Halle, pp. 232–285. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
30
Chomsky, N. (1981). Lectures on Government and Binding. Dordrecht: Foris.
Chomsky, N. (1982). Some Concepts and Consequences of the Theory of Government and
Binding. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use. New York: Praeger.
Chomsky, N. (1993). A minimalist program for linguistic theory. In K. Hale and S. J. Keyser
(Eds.), The View from Building 20: Essays in Linguistics in Honor of Sylvain Bromberger,
pp. 1–52. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Reprinted as chapter 3 of Chomsky (1995c), 167–
217.
Chomsky, N. (1995a). Bare phrase structure. In G. Webelhuth (Ed.), Government and Binding
Theory and the Minimalist Program, pp. 383–439. Oxford: Blackwell.
Chomsky, N. (1995b). Categories and transformations. In The Minimalist Program, pp. 219–
394. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [= chapter 4 of Chomsky (1995c)]. Based on the shorter
article Chomsky (1995a).
Chomsky, N. (1995c). The Minimalist Program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chomsky, N. (2000). Minimalist inquiries: the framework. In R. Martin, D. Michaels, and
J. Uriagereka (Eds.), Step by Step: Essays on Minimalist Syntax in Honor of Howard Lasnik,
pp. 89–155. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chomsky, N. and H. Lasnik (1993). The theory of principles and parameters. In J. Jacobs,
A. von Stechow, W. Sternefeld, and T. Vennemann (Eds.), Syntax: An International Hand-
book of Contemporary Research, Vol. 1, pp. 506–569. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Reprinted
as chapter 1 of Chomsky (1995c), 13–127.
Diesing, M. (1992). Indefinites. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Epstein, S., E. M. Groat, R. Kawashima, and H. Kitahara (1998). A Derivational Approach to
Syntactic Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31
Epstein, S. D. and T. D. Seely (1999). Against the GF-notion ‘subject’: Eliminating the EPP and
successive cyclic A-movement. Ms., Michigan University and Michigan State University.
Fiengo, R. and J. Higginbotham (1981). Opacity in NP. Linguistic Analysis 7(4), 395–421.
Fox, D. (1999). Reconstruction, binding theory, and the interpretation of chains. Linguistic
Inquiry 30(2), 157–196.
Fox, D. (2000). Economy and Semantic Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fox, D. and J. Nissenbaum (2004). Condition A and scope reconstruction. Linguistic In-
quiry 35(3), 475–485.
Freidin, R. (1986). Fundamental issues in the theory of binding. In B. Lust (Ed.), Studies in
the Acquisition of Anaphora, pp. 151–188. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Grodzinsky, Y. and T. Reinhart (1993). The innateness of binding and of coreference. Linguistic
Inquiry 24(1), 69–101.
Hellan, L. (1988). Anaphora in Norwegian and the Theory of Grammar. Dordrecht: Foris.
Hestvik, A. (1990). LF Movement of Pronouns and the Computation of Binding Domains. Ph.
D. thesis, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA.
Heycock, C. (1995). Asymmetries in reconstruction. Linguistic Inquiry 26(4), 547–570.
Hicks, G. (2006). The Derivation of Anaphoric Relations. Ph. D. thesis, University of York.
Hoekstra, J. (1994). Pronouns and case: On the distribution of Frisian harren and se ‘them’.
Leuvense Bijdragen 83, 47–65.
Hornstein, N. (1995). Logical Form: from GB to Minimalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hornstein, N. (2000). Move! A Minimalist Theory of Construal. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hornstein, N. (2006). Pronouns in a minimalist setting. University of Maryland Working
Papers in Linguistics 14, 47–80.
32
Kayne, R. S. (1994). The Antisymmetry of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kayne, R. S. (2002). Pronouns and their antecedents. In S. D. Epstein and T. D. Seely (Eds.),
Derivation and Explanation in the Minimalist Program, pp. 133–166. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lasnik, H. (1999). Chains of arguments. In S. D. Epstein and N. Hornstein (Eds.), Working
Minimalism, pp. 189–215. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Reprinted in Lasnik (2003), 139–
157.
Lasnik, H. (2003). Minimalist Investigations in Linguistic Theory. London: Routledge.
Lasnik, H. and R. Hendrick (2003). Steps toward a minimal theory of anaphora. In R. Hendrick
(Ed.), Minimal Syntax, pp. 124–151. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lebeaux, D. (1988). Language Acquisition and the Form of the Grammar. Ph. D. thesis,
University of Massachussetts, Amherst, MA.
Lebeaux, D. (1998). Where does the binding theory apply? Technical Report 98-044, NEC
Research Institute, Princeton.
Pollard, C. and I. Sag (1992). Anaphors in English and the scope of binding theory. Linguistic
Inquiry 23(2), 261–303.
Pollard, C. and I. Sag (1994). Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Reinhart, T. (1976). The Syntactic Domain of Anaphora. Ph. D. thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
Reinhart, T. (1983a). Anaphora and Semantic Interpretation. London: Croom Helm.
Reinhart, T. (1983b). Coreference and bound anaphora: A restatement of the anaphora ques-
tions. Linguistics and Philosophy 6, 47–88.
Reinhart, T. and E. Reuland (1991). Anaphors and logophors: an argument structure perspec-
tive. In J. Koster and E. Reuland (Eds.), Long-Distance Anaphora, pp. 283–321. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
33
Reinhart, T. and E. Reuland (1993). Reflexivity. Linguistic Inquiry 24(4), 657–720.
Reuland, E. (1998). Structural conditions on chains and binding. In P. N. Tamanji and
K. Kusumoto (Eds.), The Proceedings of the North East Linguistic Society 28, pp. 341–356.
Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts, GLSA Publications.
Reuland, E. (2001). Primitives of binding. Linguistic Inquiry 32(3), 439–492.
Reuland, E. (2006). Agreeing to bind. In H. Broekhuis, N. Corver, R. Huybregts, U. Klein-
henz, and J. Koster (Eds.), Organizing Grammar: Linguistic Studies in Honor of Henk van
Riemsdijk, pp. 505–513. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Reuland, E. and M. Everaert (2001). Deconstructing binding. In M. R. Baltin and C. Collins
(Eds.), The Handbook of Contemporary Syntactic Theory, pp. 634–669. Oxford: Blackwell.
Romero, M. (1998). The correlation between scope reconstruction and connectivity effects.
In E. Curtis, J. Lyle, and G. Webster (Eds.), The Proceedings of the Sixteenth West Coast
Conference on Formal Linguistics, pp. 351–365. Stanford, CA: CSLI.
Runner, J. (2002). When minimalism isn’t enough: An argument for argument structure. Lin-
guistic Inquiry 33(1), 172–182.
Safir, K. (1999). Vehicle change and reconstruction in A-chains. Linguistic Inquiry 30(4),
587–620.
Sportiche, D. (2006). Reconstruction, binding, and scope. In M. Everaert and H. van Riemsdijk
(Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Syntax: Volume IV, pp. 35–93. Oxford: Blackwell.
Taraldsen, K. T. (1995). On agreement and nominative objects in Icelandic. In H. Haider,
S. Olsen, and S. Vikner (Eds.), Studies in Comparative Germanic Syntax, pp. 307–327. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer.
Taraldsen, K. T. (1996). Reflexives, pronouns and subject/verb agreement in Icelandic and
Faroese. In J. Black and V. Motapanyane (Eds.), Microparametric Syntax and Dialect Vari-
ation, pp. 189–211. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
34
Thráinsson, H. (1979). Complementation in Icelandic. New York: Garland.
Uchiumi, T. (2006). Binding and Control: A Unified Approach. Unpublished thesis, McGill
University.
van Riemsdijk, H. and E. Williams (1981). NP-Structure. The Linguistic Review 1, 171–217.
Wurmbrand, S. and J. D. Bobaljik (1999). Modals, raising and A-reconstruction. Paper pre-
sented at the University of Leiden, October 1999.
Zwart, J.-W. (2002). Issues relating to a derivational theory of binding. In S. D. Epstein and
T. D. Seely (Eds.), Derivation and Explanation in the Minimalist Program, pp. 269–304.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Zwart, J.-W. (2006). Baker’s generalization in a derivational theory of binding. Ms., University
of Groningen.
Glyn Hicks
Department of Modern Languages
Avenue campus
The University of Southampton
SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom
Glyn.Hicks@soton.ac.uk
35
